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In this paper we consider the interaction between local workers and migrants in the 
production process of a firm. Both local workers and migrants can invest effort in 
assimilation activities in order to increase the assimilation of the migrants into the 
firm and so by increase their interaction and production activities. We consider the 
effect, the relative size (in the firm) of each group and the cost of activities, has on the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Studies of minorities around the world show, with few exceptions, that they tend to 
earn wages substantially below those of  comparable general  workers  (Altonji and 
Blank 1999, Blau and Kahn, 2006, 2007, Bhaumik, Gang and Yun, 2006). In part, this 
reflects a failure on the part of the minority group to undertake the effort to assimilate 
(Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann, 2008).  This failure can be caused in the face 
of high adjustment costs, such as inadequate language skills, intergenerational familial 
conflicts, and, in the case of immigrants, lack of knowledge about the host country’s 
labor  market  (Chiswick  and  Miller,  1995,  1996,  Bauer,  Epstein  and  Gang,  2005, 
Epstein  and  Gang,  2009).  On  occasion,  minority  workers  out  preform  the  other 
workers (Chiswick, 1977, Deutsch, Epstein and Lecker, 2006). 
Efforts of the migrants to assimilate and efforts by the local population to 
accept them and to bring them into line with the local population are made. Often, the 
locals are less than welcoming, blaming the newcomers for depressing wages and 
displacing current workers – i.e., causing unemployment. This presumption has very 
strong  policy  implications  and  is  implicit,  for  example,  in  the  calls  for  increased 
regulations about immigration that are heard worldwide. Yet, there is mixed evidence 
about the impact of minorities on wages and employment – it depends on whether 
they are substitutes or complement the current workers, with respect to the skills and 
other attributes which they bring to the labor market (Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994, 
Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun 2002). Whether minorities actually lower  wages and 
increase  employment  or  not,  the  perception  exists  that  they  do.    Because  of  this 
perception the majority may take active steps to discourage minority assimilation – 
discrimination, isolation, and so on (see Epstein and Gang, 2006, 2009).   
Often the efforts of both parties are mediated through political institutions. 
These institutions exist in both the minority and majority worlds.  They could be, for 
example,  political  parties,  trade  organizations,  unions,  or  thugs.    These  are 
organizations which are able to overcome the free-rider problems individual members 
of each group have, in moving from the actions they desire to take, to actually taking 
them..  Yet, while an organization’s purpose may be to represent the members of their 
group, the interests’ of the organization and that of its members do no always coincide 
(see, for example, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Anas, 2002,  Dustmann, Fabbri and 
Preston, 2004, Kahanec, 2006, Lazear, 1999 and Epstein and Gang, 2009).   3
We are interested in why minorities are so often at a disadvantage relative to 
the  majority.  Assimilation  efforts  by  the  minority  and  the  local  population  are 
elements which determine how well the minority does in comparison to the local 
population.  We examine the consequences of increases in the numbers migrants, the 
local population and the relationship in the production function of the firm where both 
work.    We  construct  a  model  in  which  there  are  two  actors:    the  local  working 
population and the migrants working at the same firm and their interaction within the 
firm, in terms of production. 
Our study shows that the structure of the firm, the number of migrants and 
local  population  are  curtailed  for  the  assimilation  process.  Moreover  the  cost  of 
investment is an important component and can be affected by incentives made by the 
employer or public policy.  More specifically, we show that increasing the number of 
migrants in a certain firm will decrease the investment in assimilation activities by all 
workers both local and migrants. In general, we show that it is better for both the local 
worker and the migrant when the local workers will be in separate firms. However 
this is not always the case and many firms with migrants and locals working together 
exist. In this paper we consider the effects the size of the population of migrants and 
local  workers  have  on the  assimilation efforts of both  types of  workers. We also 
consider  the  effect  the  cost  of  investment  in  assimilation  activities  has  on  the 
assimilation process of the migrants in the firm.   
 
 
2.  The Model 
Consider a firm which has both locals L ( 1 > L ),and migrants., (foreign workers), F 
( 1 > F ).  For simplicity, we assume that there is only one group of migrants.  The 
efficiency/productivity  level  of  the  local  workers  and  the  migrants  may  not  be 
identical.  We normalize the efficiency level of local population workers to unity.  
The  migrants’  productive/efficiency  level  depends  on  two  main  factors:  1.  the 
investment made by the migrant to assimilate, a, and 2. the effort invested by local 
worker to help the migrant assimilate into the working place, b. We assume that the 
production function has the following form: 
   4
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F G  is the effectiveness of F migrant workers. Let us explain 
this further. To assimilate one migrant worker each migrant invest a units for himself 
and each local worker invests b units. 
α bL  means that, despite the fact that each local 
worker invests b units in one migrant worker, the impact of L local workers on the 
assimilation of one migrant worker equals to 
α bL .  Note that  0 > α   is a marginal 
effect that L local workers have on the effective number of migrant workers.  As α  
increases the local workers have a stronger impact on the assimilation of the migrants. 
If both the local workers and the migrants do not invest efforts for the assimilation of 
the  migrants,  the  effectiveness  of  one  migrant  worker  equals  to 
β
1
.  Thus  the 
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F G   represents  the  effective  number  of  migrants  working.    It  is 
assumed that the production function has decreasing returns to scale and satisfies 
0 > G f  , 0 > L f  , 0 < GG f  , 0 < LL f .    
  Let us consider a representative of the local workers and of the migrants. Each 
representative determines the optimal effort invested in the assimilation process.  We 
assume  that  there  is  no  free-riding  and  each  worker  invests  according  to  the 
investment  of  the  representative  worker  of  their  group.  Denote  by  c  the  cost  of 
investing one unit to assimilate by the migrant. d is the ratio between the costs of 
investment of the local worker and the migrant for each unit invested. Thus, the cost 
of one unit invested by the local worker equals: cd.  For d=1 the cost of investment by 
the local worker and the migrant are identical. If d is smaller (greater) than the unit, 
the cost for the migrant is higher (lower) than that of the local worker. Since each 
local worker invests b units to help each migrant assimilate, the total effort invested 
by a local worker for F migrants would be bF.    5
  It is assumed that the utility each worker obtains equals their wages (equaling 
the marginal productivity) minus the cost of investing in assimilation activities.  The 
utility of a representative migrant will equal : 
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The utility of a representative local worker will equal: 
 












Both  the migrant  and  the  local  worker  determine  their  investment in  assimilation 
activities by maximizing the utility.  The first order conditions for maximization of 
the utility of both the migrants and the local works with respect to a and b are given 
by: 
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We assume that the second order conditions hold
2 
  Denote by 
* a and 
* b  the optimal investment in assimilation activities invested 
by the foreign workers and the local workers respectively (thus 
* a and 
* b  are the 
outcome of the first order condition defined in (4) and (5)). 
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=  is positive since we assume   0 <
F
aa U  and 
0 < GG f . If we assume that  0 = = = LLG LGG GGG f f f  then the second order conditions hold. We will 
be making this assumption latter on in the paper.    6
Let us now consider how the investment, of the different type of workers, 
changes  the  differing  parameters  which  identify  both  the  production  and  the  cost 
functions. 
  We start by considering how a change in the number of migrants in the firm 
affects their own investment to assimilate.   
 














This result states that increasing the number of migrants decreases the investment of 
each worker in assimilation activities. 
 
The reason for this result is twofold: 1. increasing the number of migrants, against the 
number of local workers, increases the proportion of immigrants in the firm and, as a 
result, the assimilation is not so curtailed with respect to production and wages, and 2. 
the total effect of assimilation  affects the activities of the migrants, thus, as their 
numbers increase, each can decrease his/her efforts but the total investment could still 
increase. 
3 
  We would thus expect to see firms, with a large number of migrants, investing 
less effort in assimilation activities than a firm with a small number of migrants. A 
policy implication, in this case, could be to divide the migrants into as many firms as 
possible, in order to increase assimilation. 
    
  Let us now consider how an increase in the number of migrants affects the 
investment of the local population.  We can verify that, 
 











This result states that increasing the number of migrants decreases the local workers’ 
investment  in each of the migrants.  
 
                                                 
3 On different aspects of the optimal size of minorities and the size affect on society, see Gradstein and 
Schiff (2006) and Gradstein and  Justman (2005) and   Rapoport and Weiss (2003)    7
The main reason for this result is that increasing the number of migrants increases the 
local workers’ marginal investment cost . This is true since each local worker invests 
efforts in assimilating each migrant and thus increases their marginal investment cost. 
Increasing the marginal cost decreases the investment in each migrant. 
 
  Let us now consider how an increase in the number of migrants affects the 
total investment made by each party: ( ) F Lb F a
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Thus,  even  though  the  effort  invested  by  the  migrants  may  decrease,  the  total 
investment of the local population will not change. However the effect it has on each 
migrant will decrease, since the number of migrants has increased.  
Given  that  the  third  derivatives  equal  or  are  close  to  zero 
0 = = = LLG LGG GGG f f f
4 (see Epstein and Gang, 2009 ) we obtain that the effect of a 
change in the number of local workers on the assimilation of the migrants and local 
workers can be written as follows:
5  
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From (10) we can see that increasing the number of local workers in the firm will 







) if the two categories of workers are rivals,  0 < LG f , 
and the marginal effect of L local workers on the effective number of migrant workers 
is less than one,  1 < α . Let us explain this result. If the two groups of workers are 
rivals,  0 < LG f ,  then  increasing  L  will  decrease  the  marginal  productivity  of  the 
effective  migrant  worker  ( G f   decreases)  but  on  the  other  hand  increasing  L  will 
enhance the assimilation process of the migrants (
α L  increases). But if  1 < α  then the 
former effect is stronger than the latter so that as a result the local worker will his/her 






a   if  and  only  if 
0 ) 1 ( < − + α β
α dc L f LG  (from (9)), we see that the migrants increase their efforts to 
compensate for the reduction of the local population. 
Another  sufficient  condition  for  an  increase  in  the  local  populations’  efforts  to 
assimilate the migrants is 
1 − <
α L d  (the proof is presented in Appendix 1). The results 
state that if the marginal effect of L local workers on the number of migrant workers 
is  greater  than  one,  1 > α ,  and  the  cost  of  investment  by  the  local  population  is 
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smaller than that of the migrants,  1 < d , then increasing the local population will force 
the migrants to divert more efforts into their assimilation activities.  
 
Let us now consider how the cost of investing in the assimilation efforts affects those 
made by both parties.  
We  start  by  analyzing  the  increasing  cost  of  investment  made  by  the  local 
population  only.    We  thus  ask  what  would  happen  if  d  increases.  The  result  is 
straightforward: 
 





























The results show that increasing the cost, of the local population’s investment, will 
decrease their efforts (substitution effect). However since their efforts have decreased 
the migrants must increase their efforts to compensate .  
 
Now let us analyze the position when the cost of investment increases for both 
parties (an increase in c): 
 
1.  The migrants investment will increase if and only if 
6  d L <
−1 α α .  If the cost of 
the  local  population  is  greater  than  that  of  the  migrants,  1 > d ,  and  the 
marginal effect of L local workers on the effective number of migrant workers 
is  not  higher  than  one,    1 ≤ α   then  increasing  both  costs  will  force  the 
migrants to increase their efforts in equilibrium.  
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2.  The local population’s efforts will increase if and only if
7 
1 5 . 0
− <
α αL d .  
 
From the results presented above, it cannot be that both parties will increase their 
efforts as a result of increasing costs. Moreover, increasing costs may increase or 
decrease the migrants’ efforts as long as the local workers decrease theirs (if d is 
"high", namely  d L <
−1 5 . 0
α α ). In that case the natural effect, the substitution effect, of 
increasing  the  investment  cost  to  the  local  workers  would  be  a  decrease  in  their 
efforts. However, with regard to the migrants, we get two contradicting effects. On 
the one hand, as shown above, increasing the cost to the local population will increase 
the effort of the migrants (effect 1). On the other hand, increasing the cost to the 
migrants will decrease their efforts (effect 2). Above, we have presented the condition 
which shows the effect that is stronger: if d is "high enough"  d L <
−1 α α  then the 
increased c has a "strong" effect on the cost to the local population and, as a result, 
the effect 1 is stronger than 2. If d is "high",  d L <
−1 5 . 0
α α , but not high "enough", 
d L >
−1 α α , then the increased c has a "weak" effect on the cost to the local population 
and so the effect 1 is weaker than 2. 
  
 
We consider the result of the change in the parameter α  (the marginal effect of the 
local population on the assimilation of the migrants). Increasing  α  means that the 
local  workers  have  a  stronger  impact  on  the  assimilation  of  the  workers  into  the 
workplace. 
Increasing α : 







2.  Has an ambiguous effect on the investment made by the local population.
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The first result shows that as α  increases, the local population plays a stronger role in 
the migrants’ assimilation which depend more on the local workers activities rather 
than those of the migrants. Thus the effectiveness of the migrant's activities decreases 
and,  as  a  result,  they  will  decrease  their  efforts  to  assimilate.  The  second  result 
demonstrates, that  by  increasingα ,_the  local  population,  on  the  one  hand,  has  to 
invest less, since their investment has a stronger effect, while on the other hand, each 
level of investment is more efficient in increasing assimilation. Therefore it is not 




In this paper we have considered the interaction between local workers and migrants 
in the production process of a firm. Both local workers and migrants can invest in 
assimilation activities in order to increase their interaction and production activities. 
The  investment  made  by  both  type  of  workers  increases  the  assimilation  of  the 
workers. Both have an incentive to invest in the assimilation process, however this 
causes costs on both sides.   
Our  study  shows  that  increasing  the  number  of  migrants  in  a  firm  will 
decrease  the  investment  of  each  worker,  both  local  and  migrant,  in  assimilation 
activities. We have shown some general conditions under which increasing the size of 
the  local  population  in  the  firm  will  force  the  migrants  to  devote  more  effort  to 
assimilation activities.   
Increasing the local population’s investment cost will decrease their efforts 
(substitution effect). However, since these efforts have decreased the migrants must 
increase theirs to compensate . On the other hand, it cannot be that both parties will 
increase efforts because of increasing costs to both local and migrant workes, in the 
same proportion. Moreover, increasing the cost to both parties, in the same proportion 
may increase or decrease efforts of migrants, as long as local workers decrease their 
efforts. The last result, concerning the migrants, can be explained by the following 
two contradicting effects. On the one hand, increasing the cost to the local population 
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α α > + .   12
will increase the migrants’ efforts. On the other hand, increasing the migrants’ cost 
will decrease their efforts. Above we have presented the condition explaining which 
effect is stronger. 
We considered the marginal effect caused to the local population because of 
the assimilation of migrants, α  – increasing the marginal affect means that the local 
workers have a stronger impact on the assimilation of migrants into the workplace. 
The first result shows that, as α  increases, the local population plays a stronger role 
in the assimilation and depends more on their own activities than on those of the 
migrants. Thus the effectiveness of the migrants' activities decreases and as a result 
they will decrease their efforts to assimilate.  
As seen in the paper, the structure of the firm, the number of migrants and 
local  population  are  curtailed  for  the  assimilation  process.  Moreover  the  cost  of 
investment is an important component and can be affected by incentives made by the 
employer or public policy.   13
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